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THE INFLUENCE OF TOP MANAGEMENT TEAM’S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ORIENTATION ON 
STRATEGIC RENEWAL TRAJECTORIES 
A Longitudinal Analysis of Royal Dutch Shell plc, 1907-2004 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Using the upper echelons perspective together with corporate governance and strategic renewal 
literature, this paper investigates how top managers’ corporate governance orientation influences 
a firm’s strategic renewal trajectories over time. Through both a qualitative analysis (1907-2004) 
and a quantitative analysis (1959-2004), we investigate this under-researched question within the 
context of a large incumbent firm: Royal Dutch Shell plc. Our results indicate that top managers 
having an Anglo-Saxon corporate governance orientation are more likely to pursue exploitative 
and external-growth strategic renewal trajectories, while those having a Rhine corporate 
governance orientation are more likely to pursue exploratory and internal-growth strategic 
renewal trajectories. We also found a positive moderating effect of the proportion of 
shareholders from the Anglo-Saxon countries on exploitative and external-growth strategic 
renewal trajectories. Our findings indicate that top managers’ corporate governance orientation 
can be an important antecedent of strategic renewal and of organisational ambidexterity, both of 
which influence corporate longevity.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Research on strategic renewal has focused mainly on processes and outcomes of strategic 
renewal in large established firms (e.g. Agarwal and Helfat, 2009; Baden-Fuller and Volberda, 
1997; Capron and Mitchell, 2009; Flier et al., 2003; Kim and Pennings, 2009; Volberda et al., 
2001a, b). However, previous research also suggests that current literature on strategic renewal 
could benefit from studying the underlying organisational antecedents of strategic renewal using 
a longitudinal approach.  
This paper intends to contribute to the following two research gaps. First, the role of top 
managers and their corporate governance orientation are an underexplored organisational 
antecedent of strategic renewal (e.g. Filatotchev et al., 2006; Floyd and Lane, 2000; Hurst et al., 
2007; Volberda et al., 2001a). Upper echelons literature pinpoints that compositional and 
background characteristics of top managers play a crucial role in recognising and pursuing 
strategic choices (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Wiersema and Bantel, 1992). In this research 
stream, Johnson et al. (2005, p.171) put forward a much-neglected question: “What is the 
purpose of a board and their deliberations on strategy?” While most studies have focused on 
linking top managers’ characteristics with financial performance (e.g. Buyl et al., 2010; Certo et 
al., 2006), few have examined how these characteristics affect strategic choices and actions 
(Goodstein and Boeker, 1991; Hambrick, 2007). Carter (2006) and Hambrick (2007) encourage 
scholars to explore this research area, particularly factors that influence the way managers 
interpret strategic choices they face. We contribute to this research gap by exploring top 
managers’ corporate governance orientation as an antecedent of strategic renewal trajectories. 
Second, strategic renewal trajectories develop over time (Agarwal and Helfat, 2009; 
Chakravarthy and Doz, 1992). This implies that research on strategic renewal requires a 
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longitudinal approach to investigate successive strategic renewal trajectories of a firm over the 
years (Volberda and Lewin, 2003). The number of such empirical studies is limited (e.g. 
Burgelman and Grove, 2007; Flier et al., 2003; Jenkins and Floyd, 2001; Kwee et al., 2008; 
Uotila et al., 2009; Volberda et al., 2001b). Our study answers this call for more longitudinal 
research by investigating strategic renewal trajectories for a period of almost a century, i.e. 1907-
2004. 
To address the aforementioned two research gaps, we use the upper echelons perspective 
together with corporate governance and strategic renewal literature to address the research 
question of how top managers’ corporate governance orientation influences a firm’s strategic 
renewal trajectories. To this end, we conducted a longitudinal study of a large incumbent firm: 
Royal Dutch Shell plc (Shell).  
Shell is an interesting case for studying the evolvement of successive strategic renewal 
trajectories for two main reasons. First, during the period 1959-2004, Shell had a governance 
structure called “Committee of Managing Directors” (CMD). Under this structure, Shell was 
governed by chairmen from either the Dutch- (Rhine corporate governance orientation) or the 
British- (Anglo-Saxon corporate governance orientation) side of the company. Prior to this 
period (1907-1958), Shell comprised two separate companies with two separate management 
boards, i.e. Royal Dutch and Shell Transport and Trading. It was under the CMD structure that 
Anglo-Saxon and Rhine corporate governance orientations were combined and institutionalised. 
Although these two corporate governance orientations coexisted in the CMD structure, we can 
determine which orientation was more dominant at a particular point in time by studying the 
composition of top managers in the CMD at that time. This unique governance structure of the 
CMD allows us to investigate variation in top managers’ corporate governance orientation within 
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one firm over time and how such alternating orientation influences the firm’s strategic renewal 
trajectories (Filatotchev et al., 2006). A previous study about Shell by Stadler et al. (2006) has 
indicated that CEOs have their own preferred governance orientation with British CEOs 
favouring the Anglo-Saxon corporate governance orientation and European CEOs favouring the 
Rhine orientation. However, it remains to be investigated how the variation in governance 
orientation due to changes in top managers may influence successive strategic renewal 
trajectories. Additionally, while Stadler et al. (2006) focus on CEO level of analysis only and 
build on a qualitative case study approach for a much shorter period (in the 1990s), our study is 
based on different data by employing both qualitative and quantitative longitudinal designs with 
the focus beyond the CEO level of analysis. More specifically, regarding top managers’ 
corporate governance orientation as an independent variable, we focus on two levels of analysis: 
CEO (i.e. CMD chairmen) and top management team (i.e. CMD members). Additionally, we 
incorporate a firm-level measure of the proportion of shareholders based on geographical 
distribution as a moderating factor of the relationships between the top managers’ corporate 
governance orientation and strategic renewal. Here, the dependent variables of our study relate to 
firm-level measures of strategic renewal actions. Through these multilevel measures, we 
investigate multilevel interaction effects of top managers’ corporate governance orientation on 
strategic renewal trajectories.  
Second, the long history of Shell’s company records provides a rich dataset of publicly 
available data to investigate the firm’s longitudinal strategic renewal trajectories (e.g. Cummins 
and Beasant, 2005; Gabriëls and Jongmans, 1990; Gerretson, 1959; Howarth, 1992, 1998; Jones, 
1977; Howarth and Jonker, 2007; Jonker and Van Zanden, 2007; Sluyterman, 2007; Van 
Zanden, 2007; Yergin, 1993). These public data are enriched and triangulated by supplementary 
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internal data and by in-depth interviews with both active and retired top managers of Shell. 
While the CMD governance structure enables us to conduct a quantitative study (1959-2004), the 
rich company records of Shell enable us to conduct also a qualitative study of the firm’s 
successive strategic renewal trajectories for the whole period (1907-2004).  
In sum, our research design enables us to make three contributions. First, through 
multilevel measures, this paper contributes to both strategic renewal and upper echelons 
literature by examining multilevel interaction effects of top managers’ corporate governance 
orientation on strategic renewal trajectories. The focus on a single firm in this paper enables us to 
investigate these effects, which may be difficult to observe with comparative case studies or 
cross-sectional studies involving different firms from different countries. Second, we contribute 
to the organisational antecedents of strategic renewal literature by exploring the role of top 
managers in regulating the speed, direction and trajectory of a firm’s strategic renewal actions 
(Volberda et al., 2001a). The length of the period investigated (1907-2004) enables us to 
contribute to this research stream by providing a more encompassing investigation of successive 
strategic renewal trajectories. Finally, our findings contribute to empirical evidence of the extant 
corporate governance literature on the Anglo-Saxon and the Rhine models (e.g. Albert, 1993, 
1995; Letza et al., 2004; O’Sullivan, 2000; Smith, 2003; Tylecote and Conesa, 1999). In 
particular, we provide evidence regarding the effects of top managers’ alternating corporate 
governance orientations on a single firm’s strategic renewal trajectories.  
The paper is structured as follows. First, we provide an overview of the literature on 
strategic renewal, upper echelons and corporate governance models. Subsequently, we develop 
our research framework and hypotheses. Next, we describe our research methodology and 
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present our findings. Finally, we conclude by discussing theoretical and managerial implications 
of our findings and outlining potential directions for future research.  
 
THEORETICAL OVERVIEW  
Theory and Dimensions of Strategic Renewal  
Broadly defined, strategic renewal relates to “the activities a firm undertakes to alter its path 
dependence” (Volberda et al, 2001a, p. 160) to achieve a fit between the firm and its 
environment (Lamberg et al., 2008; Miller, 1992). More recently, Agarwal and Helfat (2009, 
p.282) propose that strategic renewal “includes the process, content, and outcome of refreshment 
or replacement of attributes of an organisation that have the potential to substantially affect its 
long-term prospects”.  
Key aspects of the definitions of strategic renewal relate to patterns that emerge over a 
long period of time resulting from strategic actions that a firm undertakes towards path 
dependence or path creation (Garud and Karnøe, 2001; Garud et al., 2010). While path 
dependence is associated with exploitation, path creation is associated with exploration (March, 
1991). Like organisational ambidexterity, strategic renewal requires both exploiting existing 
competencies and exploring new ones (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004; Jansen et al., 2009; 
March, 1991). In this line of inquiry, we study exploitation and exploration by identifying and 
analysing realised strategic renewal actions rather than perceived or planned actions (Mintzberg, 
1978; Mintzberg and Waters, 1985). This is consistent with Volberda et al. (2001a) who 
investigated strategic renewal trajectories based on realised strategic renewal actions.  
Like other recent studies of a firm’s exploitation and exploration actions (e.g. Uotila et 
al., 2009), we build upon the studies of Volberda  et al. (2001b) and Flier et al. (2003) by 
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investigating strategic renewal as a three-dimensional construct, consisting of content, context 
and process dimensions. The exploitation and exploration constructs are related to the content 
dimension of strategic renewal. Exploratory strategic renewal actions, indicating initiatives for 
long-term strategic renewal, are actions such as starting up new business; launching new 
products/services, technologies and activities; and entering new markets or new geographic 
regions (Cao et al., 2009; He and Wong, 2004; Lubatkin et al., 2006; Uotila et al., 2009). Such 
actions add new activities to the current repertoire of the organisation’s range of activities and 
competencies or increase the geographic scope of the firm. In this respect, exploratory strategic 
renewal actions create a new path or alter existing paths and are considered to be relatively 
radical or discontinuous strategic transformations (Agarwal and Helfat, 2009; March, 1991). 
Exploitative strategic renewal actions, however, denote a shorter-term orientation and consist of 
actions that focus on the current range of activities within the current geographic scope of a firm. 
For instance, exploitative actions include expanding existing markets, improving existing 
competencies and initiating rationalised activities such as closure, consolidation, or downscoping 
(Cao et al., 2009; He and Wong, 2004; Lubatkin et al., 2006; Uotila et al., 2009). In this respect, 
exploitative strategic renewal actions are path-dependent and associated with incremental 
renewal (Agarwal and Helfat, 2009; March, 1991).  
The context dimension of strategic renewal reflects the interaction of a firm with its 
external environment when initiating strategic renewal actions. Do firms originate strategic 
renewal actions based on their internal resources or based on external resources and cooperation 
with external parties? Here we query the internal- versus external-growth strategic renewal 
trajectories (Capron and Mitchell, 2009; Flier et al., 2003; Galunic and Eisenhardt, 1996). 
Examples of external-growth strategic renewal actions include mergers, acquisitions, and joint 
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ventures. Internal-growth strategic renewal actions include internal corporate venturing, 
launching new products or new services and closing product lines or offices.  
Finally, the process dimension deals with the temporal processes of strategic renewal 
actions and includes the speed and volatility of strategic renewal actions (Flier et al., 2003). In 
this respect, a longitudinal research design of sufficient duration is required to provide process 
explanations of strategic renewal trajectories (Chakravarthy and Doz, 1992; Pettigrew, 1990).  
 
Top Management as Organisational Antecedent of Strategic Renewal 
Recent studies (e.g. Eggers and Kaplan, 2009; Tripsas, 2009) show that the question of how top 
management teams of large incumbent firms manage their strategic renewal is central to both 
strategy and organisational fields. As mediators between external environmental demands and 
internal organisational dynamics (Keck and Tushman, 1993), top managers are considered to 
have latitude of action in making strategic choices (Hambrick, 2007). Upper echelons literature 
has emphasised the role of top managers in strategy formation and the resulting organisational 
outcomes (Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick and Mason, 1984). For example, by engaging in external 
and internal advice-seeking, top management teams (TMTs) are able to signal internal and 
external environmental developments and to influence strategic renewal actions (Alexiev et al., 
2010). At its core, the upper echelons literature is based on the premise that top managers’ 
compositional and background characteristics, such as nationality (e.g. Hambrick et al., 1998) 
and functional background (e.g. Carpenter, 2002; Hambrick et al., 1996), determine their 
orientation in making strategic choices. Research in this stream focuses either on CEO- or TMT-
level characteristics. Scholars who focus on TMTs rather than CEOs argue that it is the 
combined capacity of the members of TMTs that influences long-term success (Carpenter et al., 
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2004). However, the interaction between CEO and TMT is also widely recognized as important 
(Peterson et al., 2003). TMTs of large incumbent firms are often not created from scratch, but 
evolve over time through replacement of members (Shen and Cannella, 2002). New chairmen 
may appoint new members which, in turn, may change the shared context and norms of 
interaction of a TMT (Chatman and Flynn, 2001; Harrison et al., 2002). Therefore, in this paper, 
we incorporate both TMT- (i.e. Shell’s CMD members) and CEO-level (i.e. the chairman of the 
CMD) characteristics.  
An important feature of the upper echelons theory is that strategic renewal trajectories are 
viewed as reflections of the values and cognitive bases of powerful actors in the organisation. 
The mix of backgrounds and expertise represented in TMTs relate to their propensity to pursue 
certain strategic renewal trajectories. Hambrick and Mason (1984) argue that managers with 
differing histories of functional experiences are likely to differ in their attitudes, knowledge and 
perspectives. Furthermore, Floyd and Lane (2000) describe strategic renewal as an intensely 
social process, involving certain crucial interactions among top management. They contend that 
given the importance of social interactions between an organisation (through its managers) and 
its environment, strategic renewal “can be understood best as a system of relational or social 
exchanges” (Floyd and Lane, 2000, p.160).  
Top managers need to use their social skills in and around their firms in order to pursue a 
strategy effectively. The expectations from society and the values of the managers’ 
socioeconomic roots may influence their perspectives on how their firms should be governed, 
which strategies they should pursue and how their performance should be evaluated. Methods of 
such evaluation vary according to the national systems of corporate governance, i.e. the systems 
of corporate ownership and control (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998; Moerland, 1995).  
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Two types of corporate governance orientation can be distinguished: market-oriented 
systems and network-oriented systems (Moerland, 1995). Market-oriented systems are 
characterised by the so-called Anglo-Saxon model which is prevalent in countries like the United 
States, the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia. Network-oriented systems are characterised 
by the continental European models consisting of the Rhine and Latin models (Albert, 1993; 
Letza et al., 2004; Moerland, 1995; Smith, 2003). The Rhine model is prevalent in Germanic 
countries of continental Europe such as Germany, The Netherlands, Switzerland and Austria; 
while the Latin model is prevalent in Latinic countries of the European Community such as Italy, 
Spain, France and Belgium (Moerland, 1995). In this paper, we focus on the Anglo-Saxon and 
the Rhine models considering that during the period 1959-2004, these two models were prevalent 
in Shell’s CMD structure as an Anglo-Dutch firm operating under English and Dutch law. 
These two corporate governance models tend to prioritise key issues differently. The 
Anglo-Saxon model is characterised by a one-tier board comprised of both executives and non-
executives. Controlling shareholders appoint directors, executives and non-executives 
(Moerland, 1995). The short-termism of the Anglo-Saxon model directs the board to focus on 
shareholder value through dynamic market orientation and a fluid capital investment system 
(Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000; O’Sullivan, 2000). Such attributes are related to the common 
law system, majoritarian electoral system and a liberal market economy that tend to offer strong 
investor/shareholder protection but less strong employment protection (Bebchuk and Roe, 1999; 
Hall and Gingerich, 2009; La Porta et al., 1997, 1998; Pagano and Vopin, 2005). Moerland 
(1995, p.29) points out the danger of the Anglo-Saxon short-termism that “managers may bother 
so much about presenting favourable financial results in the short run that they overlook the 
importance of basic investments to sustain the firm’s performance in the long run”. This short-
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termism may influence managers to neglect long-term investments (Stein, 1988). In this model, 
financial performance indicators are mainly based on property or other tangible assets rather than 
firm-specific intangible assets such as employee knowledge. 
By contrast, the Rhine model is characterised by a two-tier board structure consisting of 
an executive board and a supervisory board (Maassen and Van den Bosch, 2002; Moerland, 
1995). The executive board consists of the top-level management team, while the supervisory 
board comprises outside non-executives, such as bankers, executives from other corporations 
(e.g. interlocking directorship) and employee representatives. Boards operating under this model 
are expected to focus on stakeholder value in the context of a dedicated capital investment 
system. The Rhine model adopts the civil law system, proportional electoral system and a 
coordinated market economy that tends to offer strong employment protection and less strong 
shareholder protection compared to the Anglo-Saxon model (Bebchuk and Roe, 1999; Hall and 
Gingerich, 2009; La Porta et al., 1997, 1998; Pagano and Vopin, 2005). Unlike the short-termism 
of the Anglo-Saxon model, the Rhine model is associated with a more long-term orientation 
(Albert, 1995; Freeman, 1984). Besides tangible assets, Rhine managers tend to use intangible 
assets such as employee knowledge to gauge firm performance. Table I summarises the main 
differences between these two models. 
--------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE I ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------------------------- 
In an international setting, corporate governance varies among countries with respect to 
their historical origins, their methods of capital mobilisation and their structures of ownership 
and control (La Porta et al., 1997; Moerland, 1995). Those varying institutional settings raise a 
number of interesting questions concerning the relationships between institutional differences 
and corporate behaviour, like strategic renewal and firm performance (Pugliese et al., 2009).  
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During the period investigated (1907-2004), Shell had two parent companies: Royal 
Dutch (RD) and Shell Transport and Trading (STT). Legally, the company was embedded in two 
countries: the Netherlands (associated with the Rhine model) and the UK (associated with the 
Anglo-Saxon model). Prior to the firm’s unification in 2005, Shell had no American-style CEO 
(Sluyterman, 2007). The unique leadership structure of Shell can be distinguished in two periods: 
the period before the introduction of Committee of Managing Directors (CMD) (i.e. 1907-1958) 
and the period from the start of the CMD until the unification (i.e. 1959-2004). 
 
RESEARCH FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
We conducted two studies: (1) a qualitative study of the exploitative and external-growth 
strategic renewal trajectories of Shell for the whole period of 1907-2004; and (2) a quantitative 
study of the influence of top managers’ governance orientation on strategic renewal trajectories 
during Shell’s CMD period (1959-2004). For the quantitative study, we developed a research 
framework as depicted in Figure 1. This research framework comprises three main constructs: 
top managers’ corporate governance orientation as an organisational antecedent of strategic 
renewal, the moderating role of the geographical distribution of shareholders and the resulting 
strategic renewal trajectories. With respect to top managers’ governance orientation, we develop 
measures at two levels: CEO (i.e. CMD chairman) and top management team (i.e. CMD 
members). These measures include top managers’ background characteristics, i.e. nationality and 
functional background. Next, with regard to the moderating variable, we incorporate a firm-level 
measure by using the proportion of the geographical distribution of Shell’s shareholders from 
Anglo-Saxon countries. The methodology section elaborates the measures in more detail.  
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--------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------------------------- 
Note that for the quantitative study, we focus on one of the two discerned models of 
corporate governance orientation, i.e. the Anglo-Saxon and Rhine models. However, as the 
Anglo-Saxon and the Rhine models are effectively opposites for the purposes of this study (see 
Table I), the results of the Anglo-Saxon corporate governance orientation also reflect the 
opposite results regarding the Rhine orientation. Therefore, to limit the number of hypotheses, 
we test the hypotheses only for the Anglo-Saxon corporate governance orientation. 
One of the critical TMT background characteristics is the nationality of top managers. 
Hambrick et al. (1998) observe that nationality affects a person’s underlying values and 
cognitive schema which, in turn, affect one’s behavior as well as how the person is perceived in 
a multinational group. Top managers’ deeply-rooted values and cognitions influence their 
perceptions during the decision-making process “because their values frame how they make 
sense of the organisational environment and their ensuing actions” (Clark and Soulsby, 2007, 
p.948). These values are expected to vary on a continuum anchored, at one end, by the Anglo-
Saxon corporate governance orientation and, at the other end, by the Rhine corporate governance 
orientation (Wood, 1994). In Shell’s context, although both models of corporate governance 
orientation coexisted in the CMD, the two orientations tended to wax and wane in dominance 
over time as composition of top managers in the CMD evolved.  CMD chairmen or members 
from countries associated with the Anglo-Saxon corporate governance orientation (e.g. UK, US) 
are more likely to exert the influence of the short-termism corporate governance orientation than 
those from countries associated with the Rhine orientation (e.g. The Netherlands, Germany). For 
instance, Aguilera and Jackson (2003, p.460-461) note that “whereas the dominance of 
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functional orientations among German managers helps balance financial and strategic interests, 
U.S. managers are mostly aligned with shareholders’ financial interests.” The more dominant 
Anglo-Saxon corporate governance orientation may, in turn, make managers more myopic and 
likely to sacrifice long-term investments to boost short-term profits for shareholders (Stein, 
1988). For example, managers may sell off productive assets that have an immediate impact on 
the firm’s profit and stock values. Such a focus on financial performance may result in managers 
cutting research and development expenditures or investments in employee knowledge. This 
reflects exploitative strategic renewal trajectories. As such, we hypothesise that: 
 
Hypothesis 1a:  Top managers from countries associated with the Anglo-Saxon corporate 
governance orientation are more likely to pursue exploitative strategic renewal trajectories than 
those from countries associated with the Rhine corporate governance orientation.   
 
Additionally, under the common law marked by strong investor protection, managers 
from the Anglo-Saxon countries are more familiar with equity finance than those from the civil 
law (Rhine) countries (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998). With larger equity markets, fluid capital 
markets are more tolerant of mergers and acquisitions, including hostile takeovers, than the more 
dedicated capital markets that characterise the Rhine model (see Table I). As such, managers 
from the Anglo-Saxon countries tend to be more familiar with mergers and acquisitions than 
those from the Rhine countries, allowing them to more easily access different technologies by 
acquiring other firms or engaging in short-term strategic collaboration with other firms (Hall and 
Gingerich, 2009). Such activities are associated with external-growth strategic renewal 
trajectories. Based on this line of reasoning, we hypothesise that: 
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Hypothesis 1b:  Top managers from countries associated with the Anglo-Saxon corporate 
governance orientation are more likely to pursue external-growth strategic renewal trajectories 
than those from countries associated with the Rhine corporate governance orientation.    
 
Previous studies have shown that functional backgrounds affect managers’ perceptions, 
attitudes and knowledge (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Waller et al., 1995), which in turn 
influence their strategic choices. In this connection, Bouwman (2009) argues that due to social 
network effects, directors may exert influence on a firm’s governance practices causing such 
practices to be propagated across the firm. The direction of this influence depends on the 
previous experience of the individual TMT member. As such, we adopt Canella et al.’s (2008, 
p.769) definition of dominant functional background: “the functional area in which each TMT 
member has spent the most time”.  
Hambrick and Mason (1984, p.199) identify three functional categories: output functions 
(e.g. marketing, sales, and product R&D), throughput functions (e.g. production/operation, 
finance and accounting) and peripheral/non-core functions (e.g. law). Considering that during the 
period of investigation, Shell’s top managers consistently had functional backgrounds associated 
with the firm’s core activities, we focus only on two of these functional categories: output and 
throughput functions. Output-function managers tend to have higher levels of corporate social 
performance and tend to be more sensitive to stakeholders than throughput-function managers 
(Simerly, 2003). In contrast, since throughput-function managers face more intense pressure 
related to financial issues than output-function ones, throughput-function managers tend to be 
more attuned to efficiency and profitability and tend to focus more on short-term rather than 
long-term performance measures (Hall and Gingerich, 2009; Hayes and Abernathy, 1980). This 
suggests that throughput-function managers are likely to be associated with the Anglo-Saxon 
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corporate governance orientation, while output-function managers with their focus on 
stakeholders and long-term performance measures are likely to be associated with the Rhine 
corporate governance orientation. Therefore, we hypothesise that: 
 
Hypothesis 2a: Top managers with functional backgrounds associated with the Anglo-Saxon 
corporate governance orientation (i.e. throughput functions) are more likely to pursue 
exploitative strategic renewal trajectories than those with functional backgrounds associated with 
the Rhine corporate governance orientation (i.e. output functions).   
 
Furthermore, influenced by the fluid capital system of the Anglo-Saxon model, 
throughput-function managers are more familiar with and tend to rely more heavily on extensive 
equity markets for their investments than output-function managers (La Porta et al., 1997). As 
such, in comparison with output-function managers, throughput-function managers tend to 
engage in activities such as mergers, acquisitions, or takeovers to promote rapid achievement of 
high profitability (Hall and Gingerich, 2009). Related to this argument, Finkelstein (1992) has 
found that the greater the proportion of TMT members with finance backgrounds, which is a 
throughput function, the more acquisitions firms make.  Accordingly, we hypothesise that: 
 
Hypothesis 2b: Top managers with functional backgrounds associated with the Anglo-Saxon 
corporate governance orientation (i.e. throughput functions) are more likely to pursue external-
growth strategic renewal trajectories than those with functional backgrounds associated with the 
Rhine corporate governance orientation (i.e. output functions).   
 
The proportion of the geographical distribution of shareholders from the Anglo-Saxon 
countries is likely to moderate the direct effect of the TMT’s corporate governance orientation on 
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a firm’s strategic renewal actions. Since this moderating variable focuses on shareholders by 
country, we investigate the interaction effect between this variable and top managers’ 
nationalities. The argument here is that the larger the proportion of shareholders from the Anglo-
Saxon countries, the stronger the focus on shareholder values which, in turn, may increase 
pressure on managers to pursue short-term profitability (Bebchuk and Roe, 1999; Pagano and 
Vopin, 2005). In this respect, top managers from countries associated with the Anglo-Saxon 
corporate governance orientation tend to be more willing to cater to shareholders’ demands for 
greater profits as compared to top managers from countries associated with the Rhine orientation. 
Based on these arguments, we hypothesise that: 
 
Hypothesis 3a: The proportion of shareholders from Anglo-Saxon countries positively moderates 
the relationship between top managers from countries associated with the Anglo-Saxon corporate 
governance orientation and the likelihood of them pursuing exploitative strategic renewal 
trajectories.   
 
Likewise, the larger the proportion of shareholders from the Anglo-Saxon countries, the 
stronger the tendency to encourage managers to engage in activities such as mergers and 
acquisitions. In comparison with Rhine managers, Anglo-Saxon managers tend to be more 
responsive to this propensity for external alliances. As such, we hypothesise that: 
 
Hypothesis 3b: The proportion of shareholders from the Anglo-Saxon countries positively 
moderates the relationship between top managers from countries associated with the Anglo-
Saxon corporate governance orientation and the likelihood of them pursuing external-growth 
strategic renewal trajectories.   
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RESEARCH SETTING 
A Brief Overview of Shell’s History and Management Structure, 1907-2004 
Royal Dutch Shell plc was formed in 1907 after a well-documented Anglo-Dutch alliance 
between the UK-based “Shell” Transport and Trading Company, plc and the Netherlands-based 
Royal Dutch Petroleum Company (Howarth, 1998; Jonker and Van Zanden, 2007). Instead of 
forming one company with one set of shareholders, the Royal Dutch/Shell Group was established 
as a joint venture between two companies and two groups of shareholders. The Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Company (RD), based in The Hague and listed on the Dutch stock exchange, owned a 
60 per cent interest in the Group. Shell Transport and Trading plc (STT), headquartered in 
London and listed on the London stock exchange, owned a 40 per cent interest in the Group.  
In the period 1907-1958, preceding the introduction of the CMD governance structure, 
RD and STT were legally two separate companies with separate boards, operating under Dutch 
and English law respectively (Howarth and Jonker, 2007; Jonker and Van Zanden, 2007). Under 
Dutch law, RD had a two-tier structure with both a supervisory board and a management board, 
consistent with the Rhine model. Operating under the British corporate system, STT had a 
unitary board with a non-executive chairman, a majority of non-executives and a minority of 
executives, consistent with the Anglo-Saxon model. During this period, both RD and STT had 
their own leaders: the president of the management board of RD and the chairman of the board 
of STT, respectively. Due to the Second World War, in particular during 1941-1946, no 
president of RD was appointed. Instead, managing directors were in charge of RD. Note that the 
separate management boards make it difficult to investigate the influence of a “collective” board 
on Shell’s strategic renewal trajectories during this period. Therefore, we test our research 
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hypotheses only for the period 1959-2004, when Shell’s joint Committee of Managing Directors 
(CMD) was in existence.  
In 1959, Shell introduced the CMD governance structure. This was due to a profound 
reorganisation initiated by RD president, John Hugo Loudon, who approached an external 
consultant in July 1957 to review the firm’s management structure (Howarth and Jonker, 2007). 
The review was presented in August 1958 and led to a remodelling of the organisation 
introduced on 15 January 1959 (Howarth and Jonker, 2007). That reorganisation profoundly 
changed both the positions of the top managers and the relations between Shell and its operating 
companies (Howarth and Jonker, 2007). Although both RD and STT maintained their own 
president/chairman and boards, the CMD acted as a joint top management team drawn from both 
RD and STT. The chairman of the CMD could either be the president of the management board 
of RD or the chairman of the board of STT. The division in time between Dutch and British 
leadership more or less reflected the 60-40 per cent shares in the Group (Sluyterman, 2007). 
Nevertheless, the proportion of the CMD members from RD and from STT varied over time. 
Table II lists Shell’s CMD chairmen from 1959-2004 with their background characteristics.  
--------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE II ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------------------------- 
During the 1980s and 1990s, when competition intensified and the environment changed, 
Shell stepped back from its diversified and decentralised strategy (Sluyterman, 2007). For 
example, in 1997, the Shell Oil Company in the US was integrated into the group. In 2004, 
Shell’s reputation suffered from the overestimation of oil reserves (Cummins and Beasant, 
2005). Ultimately, this major event and other internal disturbances led to the unification of Shell. 
At two shareholder meetings on June 28, 2005, a large majority of shareholders voted for the 
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unification proposal of Royal Dutch and Shell Transport. Incorporated in England and Wales, 
and headquartered in the Netherlands (The Hague), Royal Dutch Shell plc was born (Sluyterman, 
2007). Following the incorporation of Royal Dutch Shell plc in 2005, Shell merged the Group’s 
dual-ownership structure (Sluyterman, 2007). Under this new structure, the CMD structure was 
abolished and the company now operates with a unitary board and the leadership of a Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO).  
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
Data Collection & Coding Technique 
Our data was collected from Shell’s public sources comprising the annual reports of the board 
and company documents chronicling the history of Shell, publications on the history of Shell, 
industry publications and other written materials from the period 1907-2004. In addition to the 
archival data collection, we conducted a series of retrospective interviews from December 2006 
to December 2007 with sixteen active senior and top managers of Shell from different divisions 
and with four retired top managers. The longest tenure of the top managers we interviewed is 
around forty years, enabling us to obtain qualitative historical evidence about the early years of 
the CMD structure in the 1960s. The duration of the interviews ranges from one hour to two 
hours. All interviews were taped and were then transcribed resulting in 118 double-spaced pages 
of text. We used the insights from these interviews, in addition to records from secondary data 
sources, to triangulate our initial coding.   
We employed a structured content analysis technique (Jauch et al., 1980; Weber, 1990) to 
code Shell’s strategic renewal actions reported in the company’s annual reports. According to 
Kimberley and Miles (1980), historical records of actions actually taken by an organisation are 
21 
often the most accurate source of their strategic decisions. To analyse the content of strategic 
renewal actions, we developed a manual describing key coding rules (see Appendix). The 
manual provides a systematic procedure to analyse strategic renewal actions of Shell and to 
consistently categorise each of the relevant strategic action based on the defined coding rules. To 
perform this procedure, we electronically scanned 4,594 pages of Shell’s annual reports. We 
cross-checked a random subset of the reported strategic renewal actions with external sources 
such as books, journals and other publicly accessible documents. 
The coding was performed by a team of three researchers. Researcher one read and coded 
strategic renewal actions in the annual reports for the whole period of study (1907-2004). Using 
the same coding manual, two other researchers respectively coded twenty years of the annual 
reports, divided in two periods i.e. 1976-1985 and 1995-2004. The coders coded realised 
strategic renewal actions and categorised each action into two (content and context) dimensions: 
exploration versus exploitation and external- versus internal-growth action (see Table III). The 
three coders agreed on 439 of the 491 strategic renewal actions (89.4%) identified from the 
selected twenty years of annual reports. This resulted in a Cohen’s kappa of 0.82, which 
indicates high inter-coder reliability (Weber, 1990). The different coding results among the 
coders were primarily due to coder overlooking some of the realised strategic renewal actions. 
These discrepancies were then discussed and resolved using the coding rules in the manual as a 
guideline. Table III shows three illustrative examples of the coding results. We specified the 
year, paragraph and page number of the annual report in which a strategic renewal action was 
reported. In some cases, there were cross-page references found. For instance, the general 
description of the realised strategic renewal actions reported in the Executive Summary page of 
the annual report was mentioned in more detail in the later page(s) of the annual report. 
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--------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE III ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------------------------- 
   
Measures 
Dependent variables. Regarding the content dimension, we calculated the exploitation ratio by 
dividing the number of exploitative strategic renewal actions by the total number of exploitative 
and exploratory strategic renewal actions. As for the context dimension, we calculated the 
external ratio by dividing the number of external-growth strategic renewal actions by the total 
number of internal- and external-growth strategic renewal actions. The two dependent variables 
relate to the exploitative and external-growth strategic renewal trajectories, respectively. These 
variables are quantified for the whole period, 1907-2004.  
 
Independent Variables. Independent variables are indicators of the overall corporate governance 
orientation of Shell’s CMD chairmen and members. These indicators represent top managers’ 
background characteristics as described in upper echelons theory (e.g. Carpenter, 2002; 
Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Wiersema and Bantel, 1992). We obtained this data from various 
sources: Shell’s Annual Reports, Howarth and Jonker (2007), Sluyterman (2007) and Shell’s 
Who’s Who system. Following Hambrick’s (2007) suggestion to incorporate temporal lags, we 
lagged all independent, moderating and control variables by one year to take into account the 
lagged effect of realised strategic renewal actions initiated by top managers. Two independent 
variables are used. The first independent variable relates to nationality. For the CEO-level 
measures, we categorise the chairmen of the CMD with respect to nationality by using a binary 
code. For the TMT-level measures, we calculate the proportion of the CMD members (excluding 
the chairmen) from Anglo-Saxon countries. The second independent variable relates to 
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functional backgrounds. At the CEO level, i.e. the chairmen of the CMD, we use the measure of 
the dominant functional backgrounds of CMD chairmen. According to Howarth and Jonker 
(2007) and Sluyterman (2007, p.279), Shell’s CMD chairmen can be divided into five functional 
background categories: (1) general management and administration, (2) personnel, (3) finance, 
(4) upstream and (5) downstream. The first three functions fall into the category of throughput 
functions consisting of operation, finance and accounting (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). Since 
upstream function relies heavily on research and development activities and downstream 
function relates to sales and marketing activities, upstream and downstream can be categorised as 
output functions consisting of R&D, sales and marketing (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). Based 
on this breakdown, we categorise the CMD chairmen according to functional backgrounds 
associated with either the Anglo-Saxon corporate governance orientation (i.e. throughput 
functions) or the Rhine corporate governance orientation (i.e. output functions). At the TMT 
level, we calculate the proportion of CMD members with Anglo-Saxon functional backgrounds 
by dividing the number of CMD members (excluding the chairmen) with the throughput-oriented 
functional backgrounds by the total number of CMD members. 
 
Moderating Variable. Using data obtained from Shell’s annual reports of the period 1959-2004, 
triangulated with the data collected by Sluyterman (2009), we calculated the proportion of Shell 
shareholders from Anglo-Saxon countries. We use this proportion as a moderating variable, 
lagged by one year. As the moderating variable focuses on shareholders by country, we 
investigate the interaction effect between this variable and top managers’ nationalities at the 
level of CMD members. 
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Control Variables. We use control variables specific to the oil industry. The control variables are 
lagged by one year. First, oil prices are used to control for environmental dynamism in the oil 
industry. We use oil prices adjusted for inflation based on $2007 prices, as reported in BP’s 
Statistical Review of World Energy 2008. Second, we follow Matusik and Hill (1998), defining 
environmental competitiveness as the extent to which external environments are characterised by 
intense competition. To this end, we used competitive diversity (Ferrier et al, 1999) which is the 
inverse of the concentration ratio computed as the percentage of market share held by the four 
largest firms in the oil industry (C4). The market share data is based on work by Van Zanden 
(2007) and the Thomson One Banker database.  
 
ANALYSES AND RESULTS 
Qualitative Study: 1907-2004 
To structure the analysis of strategic renewal actions for the whole period 1907-2004, we divided 
the total 98-year period into five meaningful periods: (1) the early period of Shell, World War I, 
and the post-war period (1907-1926); (2) the pre-war period and World War II (1927-1946); (3) 
the post World War II period until the mid 1960s, including the reorganisation that led to the 
creation of Shell’s CMD (1947-1966); (4) the period of staying competitive and dealing with 
OPEC pricing policy (1967-1986); and (5) the turbulent period that led to the incorporation of 
Royal Dutch Shell plc (1987-2004).   
Table IV presents the average of strategic renewal actions for the five successive periods. 
For the content and context dimensions, we computed the exploitation ratio, exploration ratio, 
external ratio and internal ratio. For the process dimension, we computed the frequency/speed 
(average strategic renewal actions in twenty-year periods) and volatility (standard deviation) of 
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strategic renewal actions. Three main long-term trends in strategic renewal appear in Table IV. 
First, the exploration ratio increased until the mid 1960s and subsequently decreased, i.e. a long-
run change occurred from an exploratory strategic renewal trajectory towards an exploitative 
strategic renewal trajectory. Second, the internal ratio was high until the Second World War and 
thereafter lower and relatively stable. Third, the frequency of strategic renewal actions increased 
over time and the volatility was highest in the period after World War II until the mid-1980s, 
before slightly decreasing in the period 1987-2004. Below, we highlight interesting 
developments for a few periods and relate these to indicators of top managers’ corporate 
governance orientation. 
--------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE IV ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------------------------- 
Regarding external-growth strategic renewal trajectories, Table IV shows that Shell’s 
external ratio generally decreased during the period 1927-1946. This could be attributed to the 
environmental turbulence due to the Great Depression in the 1930s and World War II. During 
these turbulent times, the firm was relatively cautious in initiating or forming external alliances. 
The period 1967-1986 shows the highest external ratio, indicating that Shell was focused on 
growth through externally-oriented initiatives such as mergers, acquisitions, joint ventures and 
alliances. In the period 1987-2004, there was a slight drop in the external ratio due to intensified 
competition in the oil industry, which prompted Shell reduce to its diversification through 
external growth (Sluyterman, 2007).  
The most explorative period of strategic renewal appears to have been the period 1947-
1966. Although World War II was an important environmental shock in the corporate landscape 
of the oil and gas industry, Shell appeared to grasp opportunities in the wake of the war through 
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numerous diversified initiatives outside its core business in oil (Yergin, 1993; Howarth, 1998; 
Howarth and Jonker, 2007). This historical evidence is corroborated by the insight from one of 
our interviews. During the interview, a retired top manager indicated that in the 1960s, Shell’s 
focus on stakeholders (associated with the Rhine corporate governance orientation; see Table I) 
was stronger than its focus on shareholders, encouraging the firm to focus on long-term 
explorations. 
“In my early years at Shell that was in the 1960s, I remember that the top managers had a view 
of employees come first then shareholders. Shell highly valued the contribution of employees. Of 
course, as a profit-oriented company, focusing on profit maximisation or shareholder values was 
also an important agenda for managers but not their first and foremost priority.” (Interview with 
a former top manager of Shell, 4 August 2007) 
 
We found support for this statement from the historical archive at Shell, i.e. in the CMD Minutes 
of Meeting dated 4 May 1971: “In the late 1960s, shareholders did not necessarily come first.” 
(Shell’s CMD files, DCS, S 65). The CMD chairmen during the 1960s were presidents of RD, 
J.H. Loudon and L.E.J. Brouwer, both of them were Dutchmen with upstream (output-function) 
backgrounds (see Table II).  
In the period 1967-1986, Shell’s exploitative strategic renewal trajectory demonstrated an 
increasing trend. This trend reflected the environmental turbulence of the time, due to the energy 
crisis in 1973 and OPEC pricing policy from 1973 to 1986, which increased the firm’s 
propensity to pursue exploitative strategic renewal actions. The decreasing trend of Shell’s 
exploratory strategic renewal trajectories in the period 1987-2004 indicates a tendency of the 
company to focus more on improving existing competencies rather than building new 
competencies. This coincides with the shift towards a stronger emphasis on shareholder values.  
In the annual reports, the shift towards paying more explicit attention to shareholders was 
noticeable. For instance, the report of 1988 mentioned “the endeavour to maintain profitability to 
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provide value to shareholders” (p.3) followed by the view in 1993 that “return on capital 
employed is our key profitability criterion” (p.1). This signifies a strong orientation towards the 
Anglo-Saxon model. The following interview quotes reflect this shift: 
“I think if we look back until, say 1990s, the shareholders were there and they were very much 
respected. But the shareholders didn’t have a lot of influence before they got a lot more influence 
in the mid 1990s.” (Interview with a current top manager of Shell, 14 May 2007) 
“In my view, the shareholder orientation was particularly very strong in the mid 90s. We became 
more Anglo-Saxon. The peak of this orientation occurred at the integration of Shell Oil in 1997.”  
(Interview with a former top manager of Shell, 29 March 2007) 
 
Additionally, one of the top managers of Shell shared with us his experience of the 
difference between being led by a British chairman and by a Dutch chairman. He pointed out that 
he could see there was a shift towards a stronger shareholder emphasis when the chairman of 
CMD was a Briton:  
“When the Dutch was in charge, there was a strong commitment to long-term technological 
excellence in the Shell culture. But when the Briton was in charge, the rising demands and 
pressures of shareholders were emphasised. The system of performance-related payment was 
created. But this transformation process did not go smoothly as it did not fit with the previous 
Dutchman values which were so pervasive in the Shell culture”  
(Interview with a current top manager of Shell, 3 April 2007) 
 
For the period of the 1960s until the unification, the triangulation of the above qualitative 
historical evidence with our hypotheses indicates that top managers with the Anglo-Saxon 
corporate governance orientation are more likely to pursue exploitative and external-growth 
strategic renewal trajectories than those with the Rhine orientation. This qualitative inference 
will be tested in the following quantitative study. 
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Quantitative Study: 1959-2004 
Descriptive statistics are shown in Table V. To examine the issue of multicollinearity, we 
calculated variance inflation factors (VIF) for each of the regression equations. The calculated 
VIF values range from 2.3 to 2.9, thus well below the rule-of-thumb cut-off of 10 (Hair et al., 
1998). Table VI provides the results of our hierarchical regression analyses. 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE V AND TABLE VI ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 The baseline models (Models 1 and 4) contain the control variables. Models 2 and 5 
incorporate the CEO- and TMT-level variables of top managers’ Anglo-Saxon corporate 
governance orientation regarding exploitative and external-growth strategic renewal trajectories 
respectively. Models 3 and 6 examine the moderating effect of shareholders from Anglo-Saxon 
countries on exploitative and external-growth strategic renewal trajectories. 
 Model 2 investigates the effect of top managers’ Anglo-Saxon corporate governance 
orientation on exploitative strategic renewal trajectories. First, regarding top managers’ 
nationality, Model 2 shows that the coefficients of the CMD members and chairmen for 
exploitative strategic renewal trajectories are positive and significant (β of CMD = 0.142, p < 
0.01; β of chairman = 0.136, p < 0.05). Thus, hypothesis 1a, which relates top managers from 
countries associated with the Anglo-Saxon corporate governance orientation to exploitative 
strategic renewal trajectories is supported. Second, regarding functional backgrounds, the 
coefficients of the CMD members and chairmen for exploitative strategic renewal trajectories is 
positive and significant (β of CMD= 0.143, p < 0.01; β of chairman = 0.135, p < 0.05). Thus, 
hypothesis 2a, which relates top managers with throughput-oriented functional backgrounds to 
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exploitative strategic renewal trajectories, is also supported. Overall, these findings suggest that 
top managers’ Anglo-Saxon corporate governance orientation by nationality and functional 
backgrounds relate positively to the extent to which managers pursue exploitative strategic 
renewal trajectories. 
 Model 5 investigates the effect of top managers’ Anglo-Saxon corporate governance 
orientation on external-growth strategic renewal trajectories. Regarding the nationality of top 
managers, the coefficients for external-growth strategic renewal trajectories are positive and 
significant both for the CMD- and the chairman-level variables (β of CMD = 0.153, p < 0.001; β 
of chairman = 0.156, p < 0.001). Thus, hypothesis 1b regarding external-growth strategic 
renewal trajectories for top managers of Anglo-Saxon nationality is supported. Regarding 
functional backgrounds, the coefficients for external-growth strategic renewal trajectories are 
positive and significant both for the CMD- and the chairman-level variables (β of CMD = 0.140, 
p < 0.05; β of chairman = 0.138, p < 0.05). This supports hypothesis 2b that top managers with 
throughput functional backgrounds are more likely to pursue external-growth strategic renewal 
trajectories. In sum, our findings indicate that by nationality and functional backgrounds, 
managers with an Anglo-Saxon corporate governance orientation are more likely to pursue 
external-growth strategic renewal trajectories than those with a Rhine corporate governance 
orientation. 
Model 3 examines the moderating effect of proportion of shareholders from Anglo-Saxon 
countries on exploitative strategic renewal trajectories. The interaction between this variable and 
the Anglo-Saxon CMD variable increases the extent to which top managers pursue exploitative 
strategic renewal trajectories, as the coefficient is positive and significant (β = 0.147, p < 0.01). 
Hypothesis 3a is thus supported. Model 6 investigates the moderating effect of the proportion of 
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shareholders from Anglo-Saxon countries on external-growth strategic renewal trajectories. The 
interaction between this variable and the Anglo-Saxon CMD variable strengthens the extent to 
which top managers pursue external growth as the coefficient is positive and significant (β = 
0.143, p < 0.01). This result supports hypothesis 3b.  
For further analysis, we perform an equal-period comparison. Specifically, we focus on 
the period 1985-1992 during the chairmanship of the CMD by a Royal Dutch executive (Lo van 
Wachem) and on the periods 1992-1993 and 1998-2002 during the chairmanship of Shell 
Transport & Trading executives (Peter Holmes, Mark Moody-Stuart, and Phil Watts). See Table 
II for a chronology of the Shell chairmanship. In selecting these years, we also take into account 
the period following 1997 when Shell Oil Company in the US was integrated into the group. 
This integration understandably increased the Anglo-Saxon orientation of Shell. Table VII shows 
the results of the computed average exploitation and external ratios during the two different 
leaderships of the CMD at Shell and the associated corporate governance orientation. 
As shown, the extent to which Shell’s managers pursued exploitative strategic renewal 
was higher during the STT chairmanship (average exploitation ratio = 0.65) than during RD 
chairmanship (average exploitation ratio = 0.51). The difference of the average exploitation ratio 
between the two chairmanships is significant (t-value = 2.35, p < 0.05). This finding concurs 
with our previous findings in support of hypotheses 1a and 2a. However, with this smaller 
sample size, the difference between the external ratios under RD versus STT chairmanship is not 
significant.   
--------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE VII ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------------------------- 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
While most research on strategic renewal focuses on processes and outcomes of strategic 
renewal with fairly short durations, little attention has been paid to (1) organisational antecedents 
of strategic renewal and (2) taking a longitudinal approach. This paper intends to address these 
two research gaps by investigating top managers’ corporate governance orientation as an 
antecedent of strategic renewal over an extended period of time. 
To this end, we conducted two studies. First, we undertook a qualitative study of Shell’s 
strategic renewal trajectories from 1907 until 2004. This resulted in a longitudinal analysis of 
strategic renewal actions, including qualitative evidence regarding the influence of corporate 
governance orientation on strategic renewal. Second, we conducted a quantitative study to 
investigate the influence of top managers’ corporate governance orientation on strategic renewal 
by focusing on the unique governance structure of Shell’s Committee of Managing Directors 
(CMD) that existed from 1959-2004. The CMD structure provides a unique opportunity to 
investigate how alternating corporate governance orientation of top managers within one firm 
can result in different strategic choices that alter the firm’s strategic renewal trajectories 
(Filatotchev et al., 2006). To analyse this phenomenon, we investigated multilevel interaction 
effects of top managers’ corporate governance orientation on strategic renewal using multilevel 
measures.  
 We developed and tested three hypotheses resulting in the following empirical findings. 
First, we found support for our hypothesis that top managers with an Anglo-Saxon corporate 
governance orientation are more likely to pursue exploitative strategic renewal trajectories than 
those with a Rhine corporate governance orientation due to their greater emphasis on short-term 
shareholder values. Our results by top managers’ nationality (hypothesis 1a) and functional 
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backgrounds (hypothesis 2a) support this hypothesis. Second, our findings by top managers’ 
nationality (hypothesis 1b) and functional backgrounds (hypothesis 2b) indicate that top 
managers with an Anglo-Saxon corporate governance orientation are more likely to pursue 
external-growth strategic renewal trajectories than those with a Rhine corporate governance 
orientation. Finally, we examined the moderating effects of the proportion of shareholders from 
Anglo-Saxon countries on exploitative and external-growth strategic renewal trajectories. The 
results show that this moderating variable strengthens the relationship between top managers’ 
Anglo-Saxon corporate governance orientation and the extent to which they pursue exploitative 
(hypothesis 3a) and external-growth (hypothesis 3b) strategic renewal trajectories.  
In sum, the extensive scope of the longitudinal analysis of Shell’s strategic renewal 
trajectories provides three main contributions. First, we contribute to the upper echelon research 
by examining multilevel interaction effects of top managers’ corporate governance orientation on 
strategic renewal trajectories (Pelled et al., 1999). Second, we contribute to the longitudinal 
study of organisational antecedents of strategic renewal by studying the role of top managers’ 
corporate governance orientation in shaping strategic renewal trajectories (Filatotchev et al., 
2006; Volberda et al., 2001). This finding also has implications for the organisational 
ambidexterity literature (Raisch et al., 2009) and for sustained strategic renewal research, i.e. 
corporate longevity (Kwee et al., 2008), by highlighting a new antecedent. Finally, we contribute 
to new empirical evidence regarding the influence of the Anglo-Saxon and the Rhine models of 
corporate governance by studying the effects of top managers within one firm alternating 
between these two models over time (Albert, 1993; Judge, 2010). This new evidence may also 
contribute to the societal debate regarding the advantages and disadvantages of focusing on 
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shareholder value versus stakeholder value by highlighting the implications of each for firms’ 
strategic renewal. 
Overall, our results illustrate that top managers’ Anglo-Saxon corporate governance 
orientation is positively related to the extent to which they pursue exploitative and external-
growth strategic renewal trajectories. This implies that the Rhine corporate governance 
orientation is positively related to the extent to which top managers pursue exploratory and 
internal-growth strategic renewal trajectories.  These findings provide complementary empirical 
evidence to the upper-echelon perspective (Hambrick and Mason, 1984), particularly to the 
understanding of the dynamic impact of top management teams and their corporate governance 
orientations on a firm’s strategic renewal over time. These findings are also relevant for the 
organisational ambidexterity literature in which longitudinal research of “sequential 
ambidexterity” (Raisch et al., 2010) is still under-researched. In sum, regarding research 
implications, our study shows that top managers’ corporate governance orientation appears to be 
an important antecedent of strategic renewal and of organisational ambidexterity, both of which 
influence corporate longevity. 
 
Limitations and Future Research 
Our study has several limitations suggesting an agenda for future research. First, as our study 
focuses on a single-firm context, care should be taken about generalising our findings. In this 
sense, a potential issue for future research is to incorporate varying industry contexts for a further 
understanding of the influence of top management team corporate governance orientation on 
strategic renewal (Filatotchev, 2007). As Malerba (2004, 2005) and Teece et al. (1997) propound 
that a strategic path depends on a specific industry in which it takes place, studying the industry 
34 
context may prove useful. It is possible that due to differences among industries regarding 
resources such as managers, knowledge, and technology (Malerba, 2004, 2005), the effect of top 
managers’ corporate governance orientation on how firms in different industries conduct 
strategic renewal may differ. For instance, science-intensive industries (e.g. pharmaceuticals) 
that require a lot of high risk capital for research and development may encourage exploratory 
strategic renewal actions even when the top management teams have an Anglo-Saxon corporate 
governance orientation. It should also be noted that typically top managers in these sectors have 
functional backgrounds that make them more sensitive to new technology development and 
advancement. 
 Second, our analysis of the strategic renewal actions of a firm focuses on the managerial 
intentionality perspective (Volberda and Lewin, 2003; Hutzschenreuter et al., 2007). It will be 
useful in future research to investigate the interaction between contextual factors from the 
external environment and internal firm strategies (Pettigrew, 1987). Such an approach will 
contribute to the understanding of “the effectiveness of corporate governance practices in terms 
of alignment of organisations with a more contextualised view of organisational environments” 
(Filatotchev, 2007, p.1056). Taking a coevolutionary perspective would also be interesting. For 
instance, it may be interesting to investigate how higher exploration ratios in strategic renewal, 
indicating a higher level of absorptive capacity, enable a firm’s proactiveness to cope with 
environmental change (Van Den Bosch et al., 1999). 
Third, our focus is on top managers. Future research may investigate the impact of other 
management levels, i.e. middle-level and operational-level managers, on strategic renewal 
actions, particularly regarding exploitation and exploration (Mom et al., 2007). It may also be 
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interesting to study how managers across hierarchical levels deal with strategic role conflict in 
managing strategic renewal trajectories (Floyd and Lane, 2000).  
Fourth, our study was limited by a lack of data to take into account the size of strategic 
renewal actions. As in other recent research based on content analysis (e.g. Uotila et al., 2009), 
we assume that each strategic action has the same weight (Volberda et al., 2001b; Flier et al., 
2003). Finally, more longitudinal research is needed (Kieser, 1994; Helfat, 2000). By combining 
a historical analysis of a long-lived firm with theory-driven constructs, such as strategic renewal 
and exploitation/exploration in this paper, new and interesting long-term developments and 
relationships between these constructs became accessible for further investigation, such as the 
impact of alternating TMT’s corporate governance orientation on a firm’s strategic renewal 
trajectories. In this way, historical analysis in management research is important for informing 
theory development (O’Sullivan and Graham, 2010).  
To conclude, drawing on an extensive body of historical data from Royal Dutch Shell plc, 
we have provided both qualitative and quantitative empirical evidence that top managers’ 
corporate governance orientation plays an important role in guiding a firm’s strategic renewal 
trajectories. This role appears to be an important organisational antecedent that needs to be 
embedded in the study of strategic renewal.  
 
**** 
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TABLES 
 
Table I. Differences between Anglo-Saxon and Rhine models 
Characteristics Anglo-Saxon Model Rhine Model 
Country UK, US, Canada, Australia Continental Europe: e.g. 
Germany, The Netherlands, 
Switzerland, Austria 
Board system One-tier Two-tier 
Corporate system Market-oriented, market for 
corporate control 
Network-oriented, board as main 
control instrument 
Political system Majoritarian electoral system 
with strong investor protection 
and less strong employment 
protection 
Proportional electoral system 
with less strong investor 
protection and strong 
employment protection 
Legal origin Common law with better legal 
protections to shareholders  
Civil law with lower legal 
protections to shareholders  
Focus Shareholder value Stakeholder value 
Time horizon Short-term orientation: high 
importance of short-term 
financial objectives in order to 
increase shareholder value 
Long-term orientation: financial 
and non-financial objectives of 
importance for long-term 
survival 
Ownership 
concentration 
Dispersed with few large 
shareholders (individuals, 
pension funds, insurers) 
Concentrated among a few 
investors (companies, 
individuals, banks) 
Performance indicator Property, tangible assets Knowledge, intangible assets 
Market economy Liberal market economy Coordinated market economy 
Investment system Fluid capital, with larger equity 
markets and better access of 
firms to equity finance 
Dedicated capital, with smaller 
equity markets and lower access 
of firms to equity finance 
Source: Adapted from Albert, 1993; Bebchuk and Roe, 1999; Hall and Gingerich, 2009; Johnson et al., 2005; La 
Porta et al., 1997, 1998; Letza et al., 2004; Pagano and Volpin, 2005; Smith, 2003. 
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Table II. Chairmen of Shell’s Committee of Managing Directors (CMD), 1959-2004 
Chairman Homebasea Chairman 
tenure in years 
(Period)b 
Nationalityb Dominant Functional 
Backgroundb  
1. J.H. Loudon NL – RD 6 (1959-1965) Dutch Upstream 
2. Luitzen (Jan) E.J. 
Brouwer 
NL – RD 5 (1965-1970) Dutch Upstream  
3. D. Barran UK – STT 2 (1970-1972) British Downstream  
4. Gerrit A. Wagner NL – RD 5 (1972-1977) Dutch General management and 
administration 
5. C.C. (Michael) Pocock UK – STT 2 (1977-1979) British Personnel  
6. Dirk de Bruyne NL – RD 3 (1979-1982) Dutch Finance  
7. Peter B. Baxendell UK – STT 3 (1982-1985) British Upstream  
8. Lo C. van Wachem NL – RD 7 (1985-1992) Dutch Upstream  
9. Peter Holmes UK – STT 1 (1992-1993) British Downstream  
10. C.A.J. Herkströter NL – RD 5 (1993-1998) Dutch  Finance  
 
11. M. Moody-Stuart UK – STT 3 (1998-2001) British Upstream  
12. P.Watts UK – STT 2 (2001-2002) British Upstream  
13. Jeroen van der Veer NL – RD 2 (2002-2004) Dutch Downstream  
Notes: 
aNL = The Netherlands; UK = United Kingdom; RD = Royal Dutch; STT = Shell Transport & Trading 
bSource: Howarth & Jonker, 2007; Sluyterman, 2007 (p.279); Shell Annual Reports 1959-2004
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Table III. Illustrative examples of coding of strategic renewal actions  
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1969 12th  24 Canada: formation of 
joint venture ShelPac 
Research and 
Development; 
Canadian Pacific  
“Innovation in action is seen in the formation of a 
company by Shell Canada to construct a pipeline to 
transport solids between Alberta and the Pacific 
Coast. This will benefit from an agreement between 
Shell Canada and Canadian Pacific to pool their 
research, technical and economic studies on this 
subject and to form a jointly owned company, 
ShelPac Research and Development” 
1 1 
1984 9th  10 Netherlands: 
formation of 
renewable energy 
systems 
“A new company has been established in the 
Netherlands to develop and market solar energy 
systems world wide.”  
1 0 
1993 5th, 
4th  
1, 
18  
Group companies: 
cost reduction and 
efficiency 
improvement 
programmes 
“Group companies therefore continued with further 
cost reduction and efficiency improvement 
programmes, particularly in Europe and North 
America.” (p.1) 
0 0 
Source: Coding results of Shell’s Annual Reports 
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Table IV. Twenty-year periodisation of Shell’s strategic renewal actions, 1907-2004 
Strategic Renewal Actions 1907-
1926
1927-
1946*
1947-
1966
1967-
1986
1987-
2004 
Total 
(1907-
2004)
Content Dimension  
Exploration ratio a 0.23 0.32 0.70 0.53 0.42 0.48
 Total exploration actions x 33 36 219 215 218 721
o New product/service  10 14 77 52 75 228 
o New technology 6 9 74 79 46 214 
o New market 17 13 68 84 97 279 
Exploitation ratio b 0.77 0.68 0.30 0.47 0.58 0.52
 Total exploitation actions y 112 75 96 190 295 768
o Product improvement  33 23 34 62 98 250 
o Technology improvement 25 20 38 73 86 242 
o Existing market/oil field 
expansion/divestment 
54 32 24 55 111 276 
Total exploration and 
exploitation actions z 
145 111 315 405 513 1,489
Context Dimension  
External ratio c 0.32 0.23 0.51 0.53 0.49 0.47
 External-growth actions t 47 25 162 215 250 699
o Mergers & acquisitions 28 11 78 94 107 278 
o Joint ventures & alliances 11 9 73 89 69 218 
o External divestment 8 5 11 32 74 130 
Internal ratio d 0.68 0.77 0.49 0.47 0.51 0.53
 Internal-growth actions u 98 86 153 190 263 790
o Internal venturing 88 78 138 106 175 719 
o Internal divestment 10 8 15 23 88 144 
Total external- and internal-
growth actions v 
145 111 315 405 513 1,489
Process Dimension  
 Frequency # 7.15 8.54 15.75 20.25 28.50 16.36
 Volatility ^ 3.69 3.02 5.65 5.67 5.14 9.09
Note:  
*Missing data from 1939-1945 due to the Second World War (7 years) 
a = x/z; b = y/z; c = t/v; d = u/v 
# Average number of yearly strategic renewal actions 
^ Standard deviation of strategic renewal actions 
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Table V. Means, standard deviations and correlations (period 1959-2004) 
 Mean St. dev. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
1. Exploitation ratio .48 .16 –          
2. External ratio .47 .13 .21 –        
3. Proportion of CMD members with a nationality of a 
country associated with the Anglo-Saxon corporate 
governance orientation (CMD nationality) .55 .15 .42** .48** –       
4. Proportion of CMD members with functional 
backgrounds associated with the Anglo-Saxon 
corporate governance orientation (CMD functional 
background) .49 .12 .38* .13 .20 –      
5. Chairman with a nationality of a country associated 
with Anglo-Saxon corporate governance orientation 
(Chairman nationality) .65 .48 .18 .23 .31* .37* –     
6. Chairman with a functional background associated 
with Anglo-Saxon corporate governance orientation 
(Chairman functional background) .62 .45 .15 .09 .26 .22 .39** –    
7. Proportion of shareholders from Anglo-Saxon 
countries based on geographical distribution 
(Shareholders proportion) .54 .11 .61** .39** .34* .17 .14 .18 –   
8. Oil prices 31.32 21.70 .21 .19 .61** .04 -.13 .21 .18 –  
9. Competitive Diversity 8.58 3.55 .52** .22 .63** .37* .12 .24 .31* .64** – 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
Variables no. 3-9 are lagged by one year 
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Table VI. Results of hierarchical regression analyses for exploitative and external growth strategic renewal trajectories, period 1959-2004 
 Exploitative Strategic Renewal Trajectory External Growth Strategic Renewal Trajectory 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Control Variables a       
Oil prices .025 (.001) .022 (.001) .027 (.001) .015 (.001) .017 (.001) .019 (.001) 
Competitive diversity .021 (.002) .023 (.002) .022 (.002) -.013 (.002) -.010 (.002) -.016 (.002) 
TMT (i.e. CMD Members) Variables a       
CMD nationality  .142** (.017) .144** (.019)  .153*** (.019) .058*** (.017) 
CMD functional background  .143** (.008) .146** (.012)  .140* (.011) .042** (.012) 
CEO (i.e. Chairman of the CMD) Variables a       
Chairman nationality  .136* (.007) .138* (.008)  .156*** (.006) .157*** (.006) 
Chairman functional background  .135* (.004) .137* (.005)  .138* (.004) .140* (.003) 
Moderating Variable a       
Shareholders proportion    .025 (.013)   .028 (.011) 
Interaction Effect       
Shareholders proportion X CMD nationality   .147** (.005)   .143** (.004) 
       
Adjusted R2 .37 .49 .54 .48 .53 .59 
∆R2  .11 .05  .05 .06 
R2 change F test 2.51* 5.48*** 10.76*** 2.67* 3.93*** 7.83*** 
Notes: Standardised regression coefficients are reported, with standard errors in parentheses. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
a Variables are lagged by one year  
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Table VII. Results of further analysis: exploitative and external-growth strategic renewal 
trajectories, respectively during the Royal Dutch (RD) leadership (1985-1992) and the Shell 
Transport & Trading (STT) leadership (1992-1993 and 1998-2002) of the CMD 
 RD Leadership          
(1985-1992) 
STT Leadership        
(1992-1993, 1998-2002) Differences 
 Mean Standard 
deviation 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Difference t-value 
Average exploitation ratio 0.51 0.11 0.65 0.11 0.14 2.35* 
Average external ratio 0.48 0.16 0.53 0.12 0.05 0.73 
*Significant at 5% level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURES 
 
Figure 1. Research framework for examining the influence of top managers’ corporate governance 
orientation on strategic renewal trajectories during the period of Shell’s CMD (1959-2004) 
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APPENDIX: Key Coding Rules 
1. Exploratory strategic renewal actions are actions such as starting up new business, launching 
new products/services, entering new technology fields, entering new markets/geographic 
regions; these actions are associated among others search, variation and risk-taking (March, 
1991).  While exploitative strategic renewal actions are actions such as improving existing 
product quality, expanding existing markets, improving existing competencies, reduce 
operational costs e.g. closure, consolidation, downscoping; these actions are associated 
among others with refinement and efficiency (March, 1991). See also Cao et al., 2009; Flier 
et al. 2003; He and Wong, 2004; Lubatkin et al., 2006; Uotila et al., 2009; Volberda, 2001b.  
2. External-growth strategic renewal actions include mergers, acquisitions, and joint ventures; 
while internal-growth strategic renewal actions are actions such as initiating internal 
corporate venturing, launching new products or new services, and closing product lines or 
offices (Capron and Mitchell, 2009; Flier et al., 2003; Galunic and Eisenhardt, 1996). 
3. Accept and code a strategic renewal action only if it is explicitly mentioned that the action is 
materialized or implemented in the year under review; otherwise: do not code it.  
4. Deciding on dates: look for the date of implementation. If not available, look for the date of 
agreement/signing of contract in the annual report. Check other sources for triangulation.  
5. Actions that do not relate to strategic renewal, but that are part of daily operations (e.g. 
extension of production capacity), are not considered as strategic renewal actions and should 
thus not be coded.  
6. Strategic renewal actions that are complementary should be coded as a single action e.g., the 
establishment of a research consortium/joint venture and the subsequent start of production 
are coded as one strategic action.  
7. Strategic projects started up in a joint venture, production-sharing agreement, research 
consortia, strategic alliances are coded as external-growth strategic actions.  
8. Strategic renewal actions taken by subsidiary companies in which the parent has majority 
control (more than or equal to 50%), are considered as actions of the parent and should be 
coded. Actions of minority holdings (less than 50%) are not coded.   
9. Pure financial actions such as bonds and warrants issues are not coded as strategic renewal 
actions. 
10. Joint ventures that are established for the purpose of experimenting with new technologies or 
operating in new markets should be coded as exploration. If it is not clear for what purpose a 
joint venture is established, it should be coded as exploitation.  
11. Drilling a new oilfield in a new unexploited country is coded as exploration, each additional 
oilfield in that same country is considered as exploitation.  
12. Acquisitions of interests/territories are coded as external strategic actions since they imply 
participation of parties outside Shell.  
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